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Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law  
Mohamed Elewa Badar*  
Abstract 
In 1966, Judge Jessup of the International Court of Justice pointed out that the 
appearance of an English translation of the teaching on the 'Islamic law of nations' of 
an eighth-century Islamic jurist (Shaybānī) is particularly timely and of so much 
interest because of the debate over the question whether the international law, of 
which Hugo Grotius is often called the father, is so completely Western-European in 
inspiration and outlook as to make it unsuitable for universal application in the 
context of a much wider and more varied international community of States. 
However, there has been little analysis of the role of Islam in shaping the modern 
European law of war and its progeny, international humanitarian law. This paper 
argues that there is a room for the contribution of the Islamic civilisation within 
international humanitarian law and a conversation between different civilisations is 
needed in developing and applying international humanitarian law norms. 
Keywords: Islamic International Law; Siyar; Ius in Bello; International Criminal 
Court 
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1. Introduction  
In 1964, in an article entitled ‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations’ Judge 
Philip Jessup of the International Court of Justice stressed that “the effectiveness of 
public international law […] would be seriously impaired if there were no tolerance 
of certain differences stemming from various legal systems”.1 Judge Jessup’s 
observation was inspired by Margaret Mead’s work on ‘The Underdeveloped and the 
Overdeveloped’ where she emphasised: “Nations are, and should be, different from 
one another”.2 Two years later, Justice Jessup pointed out that the timely appearance 
of an English translation of the teaching on the ‘Islamic law of nations’ of an eighth-
century Islamic jurist (Shaybani) is of much interest because of the debate over the 
question whether the international law is completely Western-European in inspiration 
and outlook as to make it unsuitable for universal application in the context of a 
much wider and more varied international community of States.
3
 The same remark 
was made by Baron de Taube earlier in 1926, in his lecture at the Hague Academy of 
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1
 Philip C. Jessup, ‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations’, 58 American Journal of 
International Law (1964) 341, p. 343 (emphasis in original).  
2
 Margaret Mead, ‘The Underdeveloped and Overdeveloped’, 41 Foreign Affairs (1962) 78, p. 89.   
3
 Philip C. Jessup, ‘Foreword’, in The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar (John Hopkins, 
Baltimore, Maryland, 1966), Majid Khadduri trans., p. vii; Marcel A. Boisard, ‘On the Probable 
Influence of Islam on Western Public and International Law’, 11 International Journal of Middle East 
Studies (1980) 429-450, pp. 447-8: “It suffices to emphasize that Grotious, the founder of ‘public 
international law,’ lived in the seventeenth century, whereas Shaybani, who wrote a treatise at least as 
complete and systematic, taking into account the generally casuistical presentation of Muslim law, 
died at the beginning of the ninth!”; Christopher G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An 
International Perspective (Macmillan, Houndmills, 1988) pp. 149-158 (emphasising the influence of 
Islamic doctrine on the writings of Hugo Grotius on the law of combat). 
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International Law where he pointed out that “the modern public international law of 
declarations of war was a direct descendant of Islamic doctrine, having passed into 
chivalric codes during the Crusades, through the Christian church and into the 
modern law of war”.4 Another judge of the International Court of Justice, Judge 
Bedjaoui, has argued that the full range of Islamic conception of international law 
will be appreciated if at each stage of the analysis it be borne in mind that it arose at the 
beginning of the 7
th
 century. In various astonishing ways it nevertheless resonates strongly to 
our own era. This reminder of the remote origin in time of a legal system enables one to 
measure the extent of what Islam introduced into a dimming mediaeval West. It will also 
enable us to realise the still vital relevance of this corpus juris laid down, if may be forgiven 
for saying so in present company, one thousand years before Grotius, Gentilis, Ayala or Pierre 
Bayle.
5
      
 
However, there has been little analysis of the role of Islam in shaping the modern 
European law of war and its progeny, international humanitarian law.
6
 Writers on the 
modern law of nations have used the comparative method, but have drawn almost 
exclusively on Western experience.
7
 This bias is not justified in a time when the 
                                                          
4
 Baron Michel de Taube, ‘Études sur le développment historique du droit international dans l’Europe 
orientale’, 1926 Recueil des Cours 341, pp. 393-394; James Cockayne, ‘Islam and International 
Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversation between Civilisation’, 84 International Review of 
the Red Cross (2002) 597-626, p. 599.   
5
 Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘The Gulf War of 1980-1988 and the Islamic Conception of International 
Law’, in Ige F. Dekker and Harry H.G. Post, (eds.), The Gulf War of 1980-1988 The Iran-Iraq War in 
International Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,1992) pp. 277-300, p. 283. 
6
 James Cockayne, ‘Islam and International Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversation 
between Civilisation’, 84 International Review of the Red Cross (2002) pp. 597-626, p. 599.  
7
 Khadduri, Shaybānī’s Siyar, supra note 3, p. xii.  
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family of nations is no longer made up principally of Western nations,
8
 but of 
different nations with prevalent differences in ideological approaches.
9
 Judges sitting 
at international courts and tribunals know little about the Islamic conception of 
international law.  
With the International Criminal Court’s recent adventures in the Middle East 
and North Africa, where Shari’a or Islamic law is integrated in or has a significant 
influence on the legal systems of these countries, knowledge of Islamic legal 
tradition becomes inevitable. The ICC’s potential involvement in Nigeria, for 
example, underscores this reality as Islamic law on rebellion offers a comprehensive 
code for regulating the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts, 
and thus it can be used as a model for improving the contemporary international legal 
regime.
10
  
This paper argues that there is room for the contribution of the Islamic 
civilisation within international humanitarian law and a conversation between 
different civilisations is needed in developing and applying international 
humanitarian law norms.  
2. Islamic law – meaning and conception  
                                                          
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Philip C. Jessup, supra note 1.  
10
 See Mohamed E. Badar, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism: 
The Islamic Law on Rebellion and the Armed Conflict in Nigeria’ 2 Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (forthcoming).  
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Islamic law (Shari’a) has its roots deeply embedded in the political, legal and social 
aspects of all Islamic states and it is the governing factor of all Islamic nations.
11
 It is 
often described by both Muslims and Orientalists as the most typical manifestation of 
the Islamic way of life – the core and kernel of Islam itself.12 Other commentators 
deem this an exaggeration and do not believe Islam was meant to be as much of a 
law-based religion as it has often been made out to be.
13
 In any case, Islamic law 
(Shari‘a), one of the recognized legal systems of the world,14 is a particularly 
instructive example of a ‘sacred law’ and differs from other systems so significantly 
that its study is indispensable in order to appreciate adequately the full range of 
possible legal phenomena.
15
  
The Hague International Conferences on Comparative Law of 1932 and 1937, 
for example, confirmed that Islamic law is independent of other patterns and 
established that the Islamic civilisation and jurisprudence are considered to be among 
the principal legal systems of the world in the sense of Article 9 of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.
16
 
                                                          
11
 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, University of Texas, 1982); Albert 
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1983); Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul-al Fiqh, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
12
 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 1. 
13
 Mohammad H. Kamali, Shari'ah Law: An Introduction (Oxford, One World, 2008), p. 1.  
14
 See René David and John E. C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, (New York, 
Macmillan, 1978), p. 421. 
15
 Schacht, supra note 12, p. 2.  
16
 Sobhi Mahmassani, ‘The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine’ 117 
Recueil des Cours (1966) 205-328, p. 221. 
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The evolution of Islamic law is best explained by Sobhi Mahmassani in his 
1966 celebrated work on ‘The Principles of Islamic Law in the Light of Islamic 
Doctrine’: 
Islamic law has a long history during which many juristic sciences and 
schools of varying shades and methods arose. This history passed through 
successive periods. The first was the era of the Prophet Muhammad, during 
which Islam was born and was based on the divine text of the Quran and the 
sacred Traditions of the Prophet. But after Muhammad’s death, the jurists 
had to study the earlier sources of the Quran and the Traditions in the light of 
the progressive needs created by the new expansion of the changing Islamic 
society. When Holy texts were lacking, they resorted to reason, employing 
discussion and consensus in some cases, and analogy or equity in others. The 
study of legal sources […], the interpretation of divine texts and the 
conclusions deduced created what is called Ijtihad. This word literally means 
effort, but legally it was used to designate the earnest effort in seeking the 
knowledge of legal rules from their original sources. The reasoning and 
deductions resulting from Ijtihad gave rise to controversies among jurists 
(called Mujtahids), and consequently to different schools of jurisprudence 
and to different sects, the chief of which are the four Sunni and the three 
Shi’a schools.17 
Although original,
18
 Islamic law, like any other, has its ‘sources’ (al-
masadir); it also has its ‘guiding principles’ (al-usul) that dictate the nature of its 
‘evidence’ (al-adilla); it equally employs the use of ‘legal maxims’ (al-qawa’id) and 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., p. 223. 
18
 Ibid., p. 221. 
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utilises a number of underlying ‘objectives’ (al-maqãsid) to underpin the structure of 
its legal theory.
19
 
Islamic law, like Roman law, used to be a ‘jurist law’, in the sense that it was 
neither a product of legislative authority nor case law, but a creation of the classical 
jurists, who elaborated on the sacred texts.
20
 However, with the first codifications in 
the middle nineteenth century, Islamic law became ‘statutory law’, promulgated by a 
national territorial legislature.
21
 
It is no secret that most Islamic nations are viewed as being non-progressive, 
especially with respect to their national legal systems and implementation of criminal 
laws.
22
 On the other hand, the Islamic states view the West and East as being 
unethical, immoral and unduly biased towards the religious, cultural and political 
aspects of Islam itself.
23
  
                                                          
19
 Gavin Picken, Islamic Law (Routledge, London, 2010).   
20
 Aharon Layish, 'The Transformation of the Shari‘a from Jurists Law to Statutory Law', 1 Die Welt 
des Islams, New Series (2004) 86. See also Farooq A. Hassan, ‘The Sources of Islamic Law’, 76 
American Society of International Law Proceedings (1982) 65.   
21
 Ibid.  
22
 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, in J. Rehman et al., (eds.) Religion, Human 
Rights and International Law: A Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 2007), p. 5. See also J. Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law 
and the Threat from Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the New World Order, 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005).  
23
 James T. Gathii, ‘The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to 
International Legal Theory’, 41 Harvard International Law Journal (2000) 263; S. S. Ali and J. 
Rehman, ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’, 10 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
(2005) 321-343; M. A. Boisard, ‘On the Probable Influence of Islam on Western Public and 
International Law’, 11 International Journal of Middle East Studies (1980) 429. 
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However, since the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic law has evolved 
over time through the work of jurists as a response to the needs created by the 
progress of the changing Islamic society.
24
  
 
3. Islamic Schools of Thought 
Scholars tracing their doctrine to the same early authority regarded themselves as 
followers of the same school. Early interest in law evolved where men learned in the 
Qur’ān began discussions of legal issues and assumed the role of teachers.25 At first 
students rarely restricted themselves to one teacher and it only became the normative 
practice in the second half of the ninth century for jurists to adopt a single doctrine.
26
 
When prominent jurists
27
 began to have loyal followers, which would apply 
exclusively their doctrine in courts of law, the so-called ‘personal schools’ emerged 
and only a few of these leaders were raised to the level of founder of a ‘doctrinal 
school’, what is referred to in Islamic law as the madhhāb.28 When they emerged, the 
doctrinal schools did not remain limited to the individual doctrine of a single jurist, 
but possessed a cumulative doctrine in which the legal opinions of the leading jurists 
were, at best, primi inter pares.
29
  
                                                          
24
 Mahmassani, supra note 16, p. 223. 
25
 Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005), p. 153. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., Those jurists are Abu Hanifa, Ibn Abi Layla, Abu Yusuf, Shaybani, Malik, Awza‘i, Thawri 
and Shafi‘i.   
28
 Ibid., p. 157. 
29
 Ibid., p. 156. 
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Different schools of thought are divided into Sunni schools and Shi‘a schools. 
Sunni schools or orthodox schools recognize the authority of the Traditions of the 
Prophet (Sunnah), as well as the authority of the four Orthodox Caliphs followed by 
the majority of the Muslims after the Prophet’s death.30 They comprise the Hanafi, 
named after Imam Abu Hanifa, the Maliki, named after Imam Malik, the Shafe’i, 
named after Imam Al Shafe’i and the Hanbali named after Imam Ibn Hanbal. Out of 
these schools the Hanafi school, the oldest and most progressive, was geographically 
the most wide-spread, and for much of Islamic history, the most politically puissant, 
whereas the Hanbali school, mainly based on the strict literal interpretation of the 
Qur’ān and Sunnah, is regarded as the most conservative of the orthodox schools. 
Other Sunni schools, such as the Awza’i school, disappeared.31 Shi’a schools 
recognize Ali (Shi’a of Ali) as the rightful Caliph or successor to the Prophet, as he 
was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. They comprise of the Twelvers (Imami 
school), who acknowledge the existence of twelve Imams in the line of the 
descendants of Lady Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter and Ali’s wife; the Isma’ili, 
followers of Ismail, whom they consider the legitimate seventh Imam; and the Zaydi, 
whose adherents followed the leadership of Zaid, the fifth Imam.
32
 Out of these the 
Twelvers are the best known and have the largest percentage of followers in Iran and 
Iraq.
33
 
                                                          
30
 Mahmassani, supra note 16, pp. 223-224. 
31
 Ibid., p. 226. 
32
 Hallaq, supra note 25, p. 156. 
33
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Shari‘a and Post-Conflict Justice (2010) at 15 (on file with the author). 
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It is hard to find consensus among the various schools and sub-schools; 
however, some consensus can be found among the four Sunni schools and some 
consensus among the three Shi‘a schools. The difference in the rules for interpreting 
the Qur’ān is the fundamental element that separates the madhāhib from one 
another.
34
 While there is no question that the Qur’ān is the first source of the Shari‘a, 
followed by the Sunnah, there are differences among the schools as to the ranking of 
the other sources of law.  
In order to create greater legal certainty, rulers could direct the judge (qadi) 
they appointed to follow one school.
35
 This was the practice of Ottoman Sultans, 
while Saudi Kings left their qadi totally free in choosing the madhhāb and opinions 
for deciding cases, as there is a strong sense of independence among the religious 
scholars staffing the courts, based on their view that the realm of the fiqh is their 
prerogative and the state should not interfere.
36
  
While today there is a general understanding among the Islamic republics that 
the law has to comply with the Shari‘a, the concurrence of legislation with the whole 
body of Islamic law, including Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and the doctrine of a 
particular school of Islamic law is not always included.
 37
 An example can be derived 
from the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which states that “[a]ll 
                                                          
34
 Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1994), pp. 73-110; Mahmassani, supra note 
16, p. 227. 
35
 Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to 
the Twenty-first Century. Themes in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 
6. 
36
 Ibid. Nevertheless, Saudi qadis as a rule follow the Hanbali school. 
37
 Ramin Moschtaghi, Max Planck Manual on Afghan Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Structure and 
Principles of the State, Amended 3
rd
 Edition (2009), p. 31, 
<www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/mpil_constlaw_manual_3rd_ed._2009_engl.pdf>, 11 March 2013. 
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existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid 
down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah”. Similarly the Afghanistan Constitution 
declares that “no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam”, but restricts the 
application of the Hanafi jurisprudence in Article 130 only to cases “when there is no 
provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding the ruling on an issue”. In Saudi 
Arabia, on the other hand, Hanbali legal rules constitute the laws of the kingdom.
38
 
In Iran the constitution states that laws and regulations must be based on Islamic 
criteria, which in practice covered the Shari'a the fiqh, fatwa and doctrine of the 
Ja'fari fraction of Islam.
39
 
 
4. Shari’a and Muslim Societies  
The modern Islamic society is divided into sovereign nation-states. Today there are 
57 member States of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which is 
considered the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United 
Nations.
40
 The Organization claims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world 
and aims to safeguard and protect its interests.
41
 Most States who joined the OIC are 
                                                          
38
 Said Mahmoudi, The Sharia in the New Afghan Constitution: Contradiction or Compliment? 
(2004), p. 868, 
<www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/mahmoudi,_the_shari%27a_in_the_new_afghan_constitution_contradi
ction_or_compliment.pdf>, 11 March 2013. 
39
 Ibid., p. 871. 
40
 This number includes Palestine which is not yet considered a state under international law. For 
more information on the OIC, see <www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52>, 11 March 2013.  
41
 In 2004 the OIC has made submissions on behalf of Muslim states regarding proposed reforms of 
the UN Security Council to the effect that “any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate 
representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded Security Council 
will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries”. See (A/59/425/S/2004/808), para. 56, quoted in 
Mashood A. Baderin (ed.), International Law and Islamic Law (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008), p. xv.  
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predominantly Sunni, with only Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Lebanon having 
a predominantly Shi’a population. Apart from Lebanon and Syria, all Arab states 
consider Islam as the State religion and source of law.
42
  
Ten countries have declared themselves Islamic states, including the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Twelve other countries have declared Islam as 
the state religion and also recognize a constitutional role for Islamic principles or 
jurisprudence. Bassiouni divides predominant Muslim societies into three categories. 
The first category comprises secular states, like Turkey, who despite its moral or 
cultural connection with Islam does not subject its laws to the Shari‘a. Countries 
from the second category such as Iraq and Egypt, expressly state in their 
constitutions that their laws are to be subject to the Shari’a, therefore their 
constitutional courts decide on whether a given law is in conformity with the Shari’a 
and can also review the manner in which other national courts interpret and apply the 
laws to ensure conformity.
43
 The third category of states proclaims the direct 
applicability of the Shari’a. According to one commentator, the majority of Muslim 
States fall between the two poles of ‘purist’ Saudi Arabia and ‘secular’ Turkey.44 
Most states have been selective in determining which Shari’a rules apply to their 
                                                          
42
 Clark B. Lombardi, ‘Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The 
Constitutionalization of the Shari‘a in a Modern Arab State’, 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law (1998) 81. 
43
 Bassiouni, supra note 33. 
44
 J. Esoisutim, 'Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?', in John L. Esposito, (ed.), The 
Oxford History of Islam (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999), p. 643.  
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national legislations.
45
 As a consequence of colonialism and the adoption of Western 
codes, Shari’a was abolished in the criminal law of some Muslim countries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but has made a comeback in recent years with 
countries like Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan and Muslim-dominated northern states of 
Nigeria reintroducing it in place of Western criminal codes.
46
  
 
5. Siyar - Islamic International Law/Islamic Law of Nations  
Linguistically, siyar is the plural form of the Arabic word Sirah, which is in turn 
derived from the verb sara – yasiru (to move). Sirah is a technical term in the 
Islamic sciences meaning the bibliography of the Prophet while its plural form, siyar, 
refers to legal matters. As the term siyar is not used in the Qur‘ān, there has been 
much speculation on its use.
47
 The most important contribution in Siyar related 
matters came from the Hanafi School.
48
 The first classical commentator on Muslim 
international law was Abu Hanifa, while one of his followers, Al-Shaybānī, became 
known as ‘the father of Muslim international law’ due to his remarkable treatise, al-
Siyar al-Kabir (the Major Siyar), which serves as a standard work of reference to-
date.
49
  
                                                          
45
 Haider A. Hamoudi, ‘The Death of Islamic Law’, 38 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2009) 316, p. 325.   
46
 Peters, supra note 35, p. 124. 
47
 Conversely, sirah is found 27 times in the Qur’ān. Anke I. Bouzenita, ‘The Siyar – An Islamic Law 
of Nations?’ 35 Asian Journal of Social Science (2007) 19, p. 20. 
48
 Ibid., p. 25. 
49
 Mohammad T. Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western 
Approach (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968), pp. 34-35.  
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The sources of Islamic law are also the sources of Islamic international law. 
They are grouped into two categories. Primary sources are based on text and are 
regarded as the only authoritative Holy enactments of Islamic jurisprudence. They 
comprise the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Secondary sources are based on opinion. They 
comprise consensus of opinion (ijma) and analogy (Qiyas). Other sources, such as 
equity and reason or customs, are accepted by some Muslim schools.
50
 In addition to 
these sources, Siyar is built on the orthodox practice of the early Caliphs and other 
Muslim rulers, arbitral awards, treaties, pacts and other conventions, official 
instructions to commanders, admirals, ambassadors and other State officials, the 
internal legislation for conduct regarding foreigners and foreign relations, the custom 
and usage.
51 
While the Western notion of international law rests on a post-Westphalian 
premise of territorially based nation-states who enjoy full sovereign rights and 
equality of status, the ‘Islamic Law of Nations’ or Siyar is a legal system based on 
the Shari’a intended to apply universally to all people in every time and place.52 
However, both propose to regulate beyond national boundaries, religious 
denominations and alliances.
53
 For  Hamidullah, the ‘Muslim Law of Nations’ is 
“that part of the law and custom of the land and treaty obligations which a Muslim de 
                                                          
50
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facto or de jure State observes in its dealings with other de facto or de jure States”,54 
while Khadduri describes it as “the sum total of the rules and practices of Islam’s 
intercourse with other peoples”.55 Al Ghunaimi points out, that in the modern world 
Siyar covers all international relations, not only those with non-Muslims.
56
 However, 
Badr argues that whatever the definition of Siyar is, it should not lose sight of the 
historical framework of Islam.
57
  
As noted by Al Ghunaimi, “[t]he Islamic theory by all means subscribes to the 
monistic theory in so far as the normative relation between national and international 
law is concerned”.58 The classical doctrine of Siyar makes a division of the world 
into Muslims and non-Muslims comparable to that of the classical Roman division 
between Romans and barbarians, without recognizing equal status for the other 
party.
59
 In this sense the Islamic classical doctrine played an equivalent role to that of 
the Greco-Roman Laws as a remote shape of modern international law.
60
 Their rules 
for foreign relations were accordingly the rules of an imperial state.
61
 This doctrine, 
however, is outdated and the practice of Muslim governments, communities and the 
Muslim diaspora indicate new norms of Siyar. As an example of contemporary Siyar, 
we must consider the membership of Muslim states in the United Nations, active 
participation in the formulation of various human rights and other treaties, accession 
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to these treaties, as well as the formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference 
and its Charter, which implies agreement to conduct relations with other states on the 
basis of equality and reciprocity.
62
  
The Muslim law of nations can be seen as a consequence of a (temporary) 
failure of Islam to win the whole world, which leaves non-Muslim communities 
outside the frontiers of Islam and the need to establish with them rules necessary for 
cohabitation, thus the making of treaties is not only permitted, but encouraged in 
order to prevent conflicts.
63
 The Prophet of Islam was the first treaty maker, a 
diplomat seeking to gain recognition for his Ummah (nation), and the Treaty of 
Hudaibiyah, which he contracted with the non-Muslims of Mecca, is one of the most 
important precedents for Siyar.
64
  
A contract in Islamic law is not merely a matter of secular law between the 
contracting parties, but a covenant with God.
65
 The purposes and terms of treaties 
should be in compliance with the Shari‘a, however, even in cases when they were 
apparently contrary to some principles of Islam, historically this was resolved in 
favour of the treaty’s binding nature, because of the principle pacta sunt servanda, 
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which the Shari‘a  fully recognizes.66 In this aspect the Qur’ān demands: “O ye who 
believe! fulfil (all) obligations” Qur’ān (5:1). In another context, the Qur’ān 
stipulates: “Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and break not 
your oaths after ye have confirmed them” Qur’ān (16:91). 
6. Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law  
War crimes encompass both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
violations of the laws and customs of war.
67
 While acknowledging that not every 
violation of the rules of international humanitarian law is a war crime, it is generally 
accepted that serious violations of both Geneva and Hague law entail individual 
criminal responsibility. Common article 3, and Articles 51(2) and 52(1) of Additional 
Protocol I, and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II, which concern unlawful 
attacks on civilians or civilian objects, to the extent that they echo the Hague 
Regulations, entail individual criminal responsibility.
68
 According to the Rome 
Statute, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over war crimes. Article 8 
defines the jurisdiction of the Court with that respect and the first paragraph indicates 
that the Court shall have jurisdiction over offences “committed as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale commission”. Article 8(2) of the ICC Statute 
maintains the distinction between international and internal armed conflicts. 
Furthermore, the Statute specifies four types of categories of war crimes: 
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1. The Rome Statute reiterates the wording of the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (GCs), (articles: 50 GC I, 51 GC II, 130 GC III and 147 GC IV.
69
 The 
breaches of the GCs under the statute specify that prohibited acts, including 
wilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, hostage taking or extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property must be in the lights of international 
armed conflict and against individuals protected under the Geneva 
Convention. 
2. Violations of laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict;  
The crimes stemmed from a variety of sources but mainly from the following 
enumerated instruments: 
a. 1899 Hague Declaration (IV, 3) relating to Expanding Bullets,70 
b. 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War and 
Land, 
c. 1925 Geneva Protocol, and  
d. 1977 Additional Protocol I to the GCs. 
3. Violations specified under the common Article 3 to the GCs which is related 
to non-international armed conflict. Thus, prohibiting any acts related to 
violence against individuals, murder, mutilation and cruel treatment and 
torture. 
                                                          
69
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4. Violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts but not of an 
international character.
71
 
 
The advent of Islam set peace as the perfect social ideal which applies both to 
believers and to all peoples and nations. However, since war is recognized as an 
inherent condition of humankind, peace is regarded as the normal state and war as an 
exceptional, although unavoidable, state.
72
 Thus the Qur’ān does not order war,73 as 
seen by many western scholars,
74
 but it does allow it when certain conditions are 
met. Several limitations are placed on the code of conduct before, during and after 
the conflict. Surat Al-Nisa (4:74) provides a general guideline “Let those (Believers) 
who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the cause of Allah, and whoso 
fights in the cause of Allah, and is killed or gains victory, we shall bestow on him a 
great reward”.75 This means that the believers must have mercy and not fight when it 
is not necessary for self-defence and they must keep to the principle of 
proportionality.
76
 Roger Algase outlines that the Islamic law of war strikes a balance 
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between military necessity and respect for human life in a manner which gives higher 
priority to saving lives of non-combatants than do modern international laws.
77
 On 
this ground, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) provides that 
“[i]t is the duty of individuals, societies and states to protect [the right to life] from 
any violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari’ah prescribed 
reason”.78 
The rules of conduct of Muslims during war time are strictly regulated by the 
Holy Qur’ān, the words of the Prophet (pbuh) and the commands of Abu Bakr As-
Siddiq (632-634), the first Caliph of Islam, and some rulings from other Muslim 
commanders.
79
 Rules of warfare, including those addressing the treatment of enemy 
persons and property, are governed by the fundamental principles of necessity, 
humanity and chivalry. Specific rules derived from these principles are mainly as 
follows:  
Principles of humanity and virtue should be respected during and after war.
80
 
A non-combatant, who is not taking part in warfare, whether by action, opinion, 
planning or supplies, must not be attacked.
81
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The destruction of property or animals is prohibited, except when it is a military 
necessity to do so, for example for the army to penetrate barricades, or when that 
property makes a direct contribution to war, such as castles and fortresses.
82
  
It is prohibited to kill for no reason, to continue killing when the enemy is 
defeated, to break peace treaties, or to force prisoners to fight against their own 
forces. 
It is prohibited to kill women, children, those incapable of fighting or neutrals, 
including peasants, physicians and journalists. 
It is prohibited to use poisonous weapons, to burn prisoners or property, to 
amputate body parts or to sexually abuse in any way, including rape.
83
   
It is prohibited to mistreat prisoners of war, the sick or the wounded.
84
  
Torture, excess and wickedness, humiliation of men, treachery and perfidy are 
prohibited.
85
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A breach of any of the above rules would be regarded as a war crime.
86
  
 
6.1. Non-Combatants  
A non-combatant, who is not taking part in warfare, whether by action, opinion, 
planning or supplies, must not be attacked.
87
 Fighting can only be committed against 
enemy combatants as provided by the Qur’ān: “And fight in the way of God those 
who fight against you”.88 The Qur’ān and Hadiths prohibit the attack of specific 
categories of enemy non-combatants who do not share in hostilities and who are 
unable to do so, including women and children, the aged, the blind, the sick, the 
incapacitated, the insane, the clergy and al-asif (farmers, craftsmen and traders).
89
 
Thus, within this context jurist developed a distinction of two categories of enemy: 
Al-muqatilah, ahl Al-qitall, al-muharibah (combatants, fighters, warriors) and Ghayr 
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al-muqatilah, ghayr al-muharibah (non-combatants, non-fighters and non-
warriors).
90
   
Jurists outlined that those under the age of fifteen and those who have not 
reached puberty yet (a child) are protected and immune,
91
 from being attacked and 
from taking part in war.
92
 This is also the age limit provided for the protection of 
children under the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, 8 June 1997.
93
 Al-
Ghazali justifies this with the fact that they ‘are not fit for fighting’.94 Similarly, 
regarding women, Ibn Qudamah provides that the reason for their immunity is that 
they do not fight,
95
 while Al-Shawkani (d.1250-1834) ascribes it to their physical 
weakness.
96
 However, jurists provide that if women and children are involved in 
fighting during the war, either by taking part in it or by way of giving advice or 
opinion,
97
 they will forfeit their right to immunity.  Even so, Maliki jurists are of the 
opinion that if a woman is standing guard over the enemy’s army or strongholds, or 
if she warns the enemy or throws stones at the Muslim army, she still cannot be 
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targeted.
98
 However, if a women kills a member of the Muslim army with the stones 
that she throws, then she must be killed.
99
 Al-Shaybānī provides that it is permissible 
to kill a woman in self-defence, but if she is captured alive, killing her would be 
forbidden.
100
 Regarding children, Sufyan Al-Thawri (d. 161/778) adds that it is 
undesirable to attack them, even if they fight during the war.
101
 However, others 
believe that if a woman is a Queen and a child is a King of the enemy and they fight 
in battle they can also be killed.
102
  Furthermore, according to a fatwa (Al-Fatawa Al-
Hindiyyah) if a wealthy woman spends her money on inciting the enemy to fight 
then she ‘can also be killed’.103  
According to the Prophet’s rulings, the aged also cannot be targeted.  However, 
some jurists believe that an aged person that is involved in planning a war can be 
killed.
104
 This follows from a report about a killing of a 100 years old man who was 
planning the operations of the battle of Hunayn. At that time the Prophet did not 
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condemn the killing.
105
 However, other jurists believe there is nothing that exists in 
Islamic texts that allow the killing of an aged man even if he is planning a war.
106
 
The blind, sick, insane and incapacitated are also immune during wartime; 
however, there are some exceptions.
107
  For instance, Al-Thawri has allowed the 
targeting of those incapacitated if they are still fit and able to fight or if they support 
the enemy in any way during the war.
108
  Furthermore, if the insane gains or regains 
his sanity he can also be targeted according to Abu Hanifah.
109
 
Another protected group are religious persons (the clergy) who live in 
hermitages or convents. This is based on the Prophet’s commands and Abu Bakr’s 
Ten Commandments to his army leader. He reiterated the Prophet’s prohibition 
against targeting hermits, but allowed al-shammāsah (the tonsured) to be killed.110 
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According to some, he permitted this because “whenever a war starts, the tonsured 
do fight, unlike the hermits”.111  
Furthermore, Al-Asif (a hired man) being a non-combatant is also protected.
112
 
This refers to someone who is paid by the enemy to do work for them during a war 
as Al-Shawkani provides “to mind the belongings and the animals but not engage in 
fighting”.113 Thus, all non-combatants are immune, even if they affect the war in a 
fairly insignificant way.
114
 Farmers, craftsmen and traders are also protected.  Umar 
Ibn Al-Khattab gave the following instruction: “Do not steal from the booty; do not 
betray; do not kill a child; and fear God in the way of the enemy farmers and do not 
kill them unless they wage war against you”.115 
In addition, Hamidullah states that “[i]t appears that in classical times of Islam, 
it was prevalent practice among non-Muslims to take shelter behind enemy prisoners. 
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I have not found a single instance where Muslims were accused of this cowardly act 
when they forced their prisoners to fight against their own nation”.116   
Dawoody thus provides that “the literature on who may or may not be targeted 
in war indicates that non-combatant immunity was a full blown doctrine developed 
by the second/eight and third/ninth century Muslim jurist”.117 Furthermore, Johnson 
observes that “the Islamic position is clear: there is no justification for warfare 
directed intentionally against non-combatants in jihad”.118 
State practice shows that the prohibition of killing non-combatants is generally 
followed. For example, the Report on the Practice of Jordan states that there are no 
reported incidents of Jordanian troops resorting to direct attacks on civilians.
119
 
 
6.2. Prohibited Weapons 
The prohibition of employing poisonous weapons, asphyxiating gases, or weapons 
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which 
are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict is 
provided for in Article 8(2)(b)(xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx) of the ICC Statute. According 
to the ICC Statute, a poisonous weapon is one that releases a substance which causes 
death or serious damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its toxic 
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properties.120 The only treaty instruments concerning use of weapons which apply to 
internal, as well as international conflicts, are 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention concerning use of mines, booby traps 
and other devices and, perhaps, 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.   
At the time of the Prophet, there were not many weapons that could cause 
much damage
121
 and the fighting was mainly conducted one on one, therefore, there 
was little discussion about weaponry. However, important prohibition regarding 
some types of weapons evolved. For example, poisonous weapons were considered 
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against the moral aspects of human dignity and consequently against divine law.
122
 
John Kelsay noted that classical Islamic texts contain extensive evidence of concern 
of the likelihood of harming non-combatants by the use of mangonels or hurling 
machines in battles.
123
 In this regard, Kelsay observed that “Muslim discussion of 
weaponry is analogous to the jus in bello criterion of proportionality”.124  
  Another prohibition is the burning of humans as reflected in the Hadith “do 
not punish the creatures of God with the punishment of God”.125  Hashmi claims that 
“the deliberate burning of persons, either to overcome them in the midst of battle or 
to punish them after capture, is forbidden”.126  However, some provided that if it was 
the only way to overcome the enemy the use of fire in such a way is permissible.
127
  
Furthermore, flooding as a weapon is also prohibited because those who are immune 
could be caught in it,
128
 similarly to poisoning the enemy’s source of water in order 
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to kill them.
129
 Therefore, we can deduce the idea that the use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) is not permitted because only those weapons that can 
differentiate between combatants and non-combatants are permissible.
130
  
On the other hand, the Qur’ān states that “whoso commits aggression against 
you, then respond within the same degree of aggression waged against you”131 and 
“if you punish, then punish with the same punishment which had been inflicted upon 
you”.132 This is also confirmed by Abu Bakr who provides “If you encounter your 
enemy, then fight them with the same weapon they fight you with”.133 This 
developed the opinion that if the enemy holds the weapons of mass destruction, or 
uses them within a war for killing the Muslims, which is prohibited in Islam for 
Muslims to do, than Muslims will be permitted to use them against the enemies as 
confirmed through the principle of reciprocity.
134
 
 
6.3 Destruction of Property 
                                                          
129
 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘The Gulf War of 1980-1988 and The Islamic Conception of 
International Law’, in Ige. F. Dekker, Harry H. G. Post, (eds.), The Gulf War of 1980-1988 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992), p. 291. 
130
 Dayem and Ayub, supra note 99, pp. 67-120. See also Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of 
Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2006), p. 72. 
131
 Qur’ān 2:194.  
132
 Qur’ān 16:126. 
133
 Qur’ān 2:195. See also Mohamed M. M. Elbakry, ‘The Legality of War,’ in Al-Shari’a Al-
Islamiya (The Islamic Law) and Contemporary International Law: A Comparative Study, Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Glasgow 1987, p. 320. 
134
 Dayem and Ayub, supra note 99, pp. 67-120. 
Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 
International Criminal Law Review 593-625 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/10.1163/15718123-
01303002;jsessionid=30xw2vefikq4p.x-brill-live-01  
 
Similarly to the Nuremberg Charter
135
 and the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda Tribunals,
136
 the ICC Statute contains provisions which prohibit the 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.
137
 Moreover, the extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity are considered by Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of the ICC Statute 
as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.   
The property to which ‘attacking or bombarding’ refers would cover not only 
cities, towns or villages, but also factories, ports, bridges, industrial complexes, 
power stations and other types of large and small real property which one might not 
call a city, town or village or which do not form part thereof. There is still no 
authoritative definition of military necessity; however, the relevant literature 
proposes numerous definitions which may be summarised as follows: military 
necessity is a measure which is (1) urgent, (2) required for the attainment of (3) a 
known military purpose, and (4) in conformity with international humanitarian 
law.
138
  Failure to fulfil any one of these requirements, according to this view, 
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renders the course of action ‘militarily unnecessary’ and ‘not justified by military 
necessity’ under international humanitarian law. 
Finally, other international instruments such as the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (1990) acknowledge the principle that it is prohibited to 
attack enemy’s civilian buildings and installations by shelling, blasting or any other 
means.
139
  
Although Muslim jurists disagree on the details of application of some rules,
140
 
according to Shari‘a the destruction of property is prohibited, except when it is a 
military necessity to do so; for example for the army to penetrate barricades, or when 
that property makes a direct contribution to war, such as castles and fortresses, 
although this principle has been violated on several occasions.
141
 Plundering is also 
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prohibited, despite recurring violations. For example, it is reported that the first 
Algerian combatants to fight against French occupation in the 19
th
 century followed 
Islamic teachings on this point. Conversely, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was 
accompanied by pillage and theft.
142
 
The Prophet is quoted to have said: “Do not destroy the villages and towns, do 
not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle”.143 Abu 
Bakr also provided guidelines to this effect:  
 
I prescribe Ten Commandments to you: Stop, O people, that I may give you 
ten rules for guidance on the battlefield.  Do not commit treachery or deviate 
from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies, do not kill a woman, 
a child, or an aged man, do not cut down fruitful trees, do not destroy 
inhabited areas, do not slaughter any of the enemies’ sheep, cow or camel 
except for food, do not burn date palms, nor inundate them, do not embezzle 
(e.g. no misappropriation of booty or spoils of war) nor be guilty of 
cowardliness.
144  
 
The Hadith also confirms that the Prophet strictly prohibited the destruction of fruit-
trees and tilled lands in enemy territories.  Also the Qur’ān reveals that: “… and 
what you cut of the date palms or what you leave standing on their trunks is by the 
                                                          
142
 Report on Practice of Algeria (1997), as cited in Henkaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 
84, p. 1101; Bahrain, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2960, 27 November 
1990, pp. 21-23. 
143
 Khadduri, supra note 55, pp. 102-107. See also, Yamani, supra note 96, pp. 189-215. 
144
 Related by al-Byhaqi (according to Malik ibn Anas), available from The Shafi’i Fiqh website in 
word format at <www.shafiifiqh.com/maktabat-shafii-fiqh/books-of-hadith/>, 11 March 2013. See 
also the Mutwatta Hadiths, available from the Islamic Nature website at 
<iknowledge.islamicnature.com/hadith/>, 11 March 2013; Heck, supra note 75, p. 71 (here the author 
compares the commandments of Caliph Abu Bakr on War and King James Bible on War). 
Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 
International Criminal Law Review 593-625 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/10.1163/15718123-
01303002;jsessionid=30xw2vefikq4p.x-brill-live-01  
 
leave of Allah and to punish the evildoers”.145 Some jurists however claim that it is 
permissible in some cases to destroy the enemy’s property. This opinion comes from 
the fact that at one time the Prophet ordered Muslims to cut down the palm trees of 
the tribe of Banu Al-Nadir in 4/625 to make them surrender during a bloodless siege 
that lasted for six nights and ended without fighting. Other jurists
146
 claim this 
practice was later abrogated by the Prophet as evidenced in Abu-Bakr’s previously 
mentioned Ten Commandments.
147
 Abu-Bakr was the most knowledgeable about the 
Prophet’s practice and the Qur’ān and he would not have given a ruling that was 
contrary to these. It is also provided that Muslim authorities have followed Abu-
Bakr’s rulings and accepted them.148 However, opponents of this view claim that 
Abu-Bakr only gave those commands during his wars because he knew that he would 
win the wars and thus, hoped that the property will be his spoils of war and thus, 
needed them intact.
149
 Furthermore, they believe that destruction of property is 
allowed if it is a military necessity, if it is in the public interest or it is the only way 
to win the war.
150
  
Some property enjoys special protection. It is forbidden to attack any religious 
sites, which was confirmed by Judge Mohammad Bedjaoui, former member of the 
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International Court of Justice,
151
 as well as by state practice.
152
 However, it is found 
that wine should be poured away and that any materials denying God should be 
burnt.
153
 Furthermore, it is prohibited to cause damage to horses, cows, bees or any 
living creature except if there is a military necessity to do so or if they are 
slaughtered for food. In addition, jurists found that if it is approved by the 
commander on military necessity, Muslims are allowed to eat and give fodder to 
their animals from the enemy’s territories, but only a necessary amount.154 Thus, the 
decision depends on the need and necessity of destruction and whether the 
destruction can be avoided in anyway.
155
 
 
6.4 The Concept of Quarter and Aman  
Islamic law governs Muslims wherever they reside. With regard to non-Muslims, 
Islamic law regulates the status of foreigners (Harbis) – those who reside outside the 
territory of Islam and to whom Islamic law and protection do not apply; temporary 
residents (Musta’mins) – those who are granted a temporary safeguard (aman) 
entitling them to enter the territory of Islam and to enjoy the status of temporary 
residents; and permanent residents (Dhimmis) – those who, by virtue of a Dhimmah 
pact, acquire the right to permanent residence in Islamic territory and to the 
                                                          
151
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152
 Report on the Practice of Jordan (1997), as cited in Henkaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 
84, p. 763 (stating that Jordan has always respected and protected against any violations the principle 
of inviolability of places of worship); Saudi Arabia, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. 
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155
 Malekian, supra note 83, pp. 126-132.  
Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 
International Criminal Law Review 593-625 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/10.1163/15718123-
01303002;jsessionid=30xw2vefikq4p.x-brill-live-01  
 
protection of Islamic law under certain conditions such as payment of a tribute and 
performance of certain conventional or customary duties.
156
 
Quarter is a contract of protection provided during wartime to protect the 
person and the property of an enemy belligerent, or a regiment, or everyone inside a 
fortification or the entire enemy army or city.
157
 Among many sources, the Report of 
Practice of Algeria (1997) and the Report of Practice of Jordan (1997) show that the 
use of giving quarters has been a long-standing practice of Islamic societies.
158
 
Likewise, the Report of Practice of Iran (1997) states that, during the Iran-Iraq war, 
Iraqi combatants were well-treated on the basis of Islamic law.
159
 This rule reflects 
the hors de combat status provided under Article 41 of the Additional Protocol I June 
8 1977 of the Geneva Conventions, which provides that the person granted this 
protection is safe, and therefore no hostilities can be directed at that person. 
However, with the Islamic aman this is done voluntarily unlike the hors de combat 
within the Geneva Convention.  
Another important rule of the Islamic law of war is that of aman or temporary 
safeguard. It can be granted as one of the provisions of a treaty of peace 
(conventional aman) or as the ordinary pledge of safeguard (customary aman). The 
latter can be general, when granted by the Chief of State (Imam) or his official 
delegate to a city, or special, when granted to an individual or small group of 
                                                          
156
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individuals.
160
 Rudolph Peters explains aman to encompass both safe conduct and 
quarter. This rule entails that the Muslim army must grant protection to enemy 
belligerents or any person from the enemy state,
161
 in order to prevent bloodshed and 
protect life (haqn al-dam).
162
 
As Peters explains, the other form of aman is that of safe conduct, a contract of 
protection granted to any non-Muslim of a country that is in a state of war with the 
Islamic state even though a war is not actually taking place. John Wansbrough noted 
that the “development of the medieval European safe conduct must have owed a 
good deal to Islamic law”.163 This form of aman is provided to those who want to 
gain entry to the Islamic state for education, business, tourism and for any other 
purpose other than to help the enemy, i.e. conduct military acts or spying.  Thus, this 
is like a visa or temporary permit which can be renewed.
164
  It is based on the Qur’ān 
verse “And if anyone of the polytheists seeks your protection, then protect him until 
he hears the word of God. Then, afterwards, escort him to his place of safety”.165   
 
6.5 Prisoners of War 
                                                          
160
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161
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Prisoners of war consist of enemy combatants taken at the time of a legally 
authorised war. Historically, the concept of war crimes has always been closely 
related to that of punishment. It is broadly accepted that both concepts (of war crimes 
and prosecution) were closely linked to the 1863 Lieber Instructions. According to 
these Instructions, “a prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed 
against the captor’s army or people, committed before he was captured, and for 
infliction of retaliatory measures”.166 However, Mahmassani points out that if the 
enemy embraces Islam before or after the capture, he cannot be treated as a prisoner 
of war and, consequently, being killed, enslaved or ransomed. Conversely, he enjoys 
immunity for his life, property and young children.
167
 
The majority of Islamic jurists claim that if women and children are captured 
they are to be enslaved or exchanged for Muslim prisoners.
168
 Regarding male 
prisoners the rulings are taken from the Qur’ān and Sunnah. The Qur’ān starts with 
providing that Muslims should “set them free either graciously or by ransom”.169 In 
all the wars of the Prophet only three to five prisoners of war were executed. In the 
battle of Badr one out of seventy captives was executed for his crimes against the 
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Prophet and Muslims in Mecca.
170
 The second POW (Abu ’Izzah al-Jumahi) was set 
free after the battle of Badr on condition that he would stop his blasphemous poetry 
against Islam and not fight the Muslims again. He broke his promise and fought 
against Muslims in the battle of Uhūd and again asked for pardon, but this time he 
was executed.
171
 The third captive was ’Abdullah B. Khatal, who was executed right 
after Mecca was conquered. During his stay in Medina, he killed an innocent 
Muslim, reverted to the pre-Islamic faith, joined the enemy, and therefore, committed 
high treason.
172
 In other occasions the Prophet released prisoners freely or for money 
or in exchange for Muslim prisoners, while at the Battle of Badr he released 
prisoners because they taught some Muslim children to read and write.
173
 
Due to the different practices of the Prophet and the two different texts on the 
issue found in the Qur’ān  jurists did not come to one majority view. There are three 
different views on this issue. The first is that the Islamic ruling on prisoners of war is 
restricted to releasing them either freely or in exchange for ransom as provided by 
the Qur’ān (47:4) and by the consensus of the Prophet’s companions.174 They also 
believe that this verse of the Qur’ān abrogated the Prophet’s practice of execution 
and enslavement as it was revealed after the Prophet executed and enslaved 
                                                          
170
 This was ’Uqbah b. Abi Mu’it. Muhammad Munir, ‘The Layha for the Mujahideen: An Analysis of 
the Code of Conduct for the Taliban Fighters under Islamic Law’ 93 International Review of the Red 
Cross (2011) 81-102, p. 90.  
171
 Ibid.  
172
 Ibid.  
173
 See Bennoune, supra note 98, p. 634. 
174
 See Hamidullah, supra note 51, pp. 214. See also Lena Salaymeh, ‘Early Islamic Legal-Historical 
Precedents: Prisoners of War’ 26 Law and History Review (2008) 521-544, p. 528; Ray Murphy and 
Mohamed M. El-Zeidy, ‘Prisoners of War: A Comparative Study of the Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law and the Islamic Law of War’, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009) 623-
649. 
Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Ius in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 
International Criminal Law Review 593-625 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/10.1163/15718123-
01303002;jsessionid=30xw2vefikq4p.x-brill-live-01  
 
prisoners.
175
 The second opinion is that the head of state has the choice to execute or 
enslave prisoners according to what is in the best interest for the Muslims.
176
 Abu 
Hanifah based this on the reasoning that if Muslims were to release prisoners freely 
or exchange them for Muslim prisoners this would make the enemy stronger.
177
   
However, the majority of jurists believe that the head of state has wider powers 
and thus depending on what he feels is the best option for the interest of the Muslims 
he can either execute some or all of the prisoners, enslave them, set them free or 
exchange them for Muslim prisoners or for money.
178
 Yet Article 3(a) of the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) provides that “in the event of the use 
of force and in case of armed conflict… it is a duty to exchange prisoners of war.” 
In addition to the above, regardless of their destiny, prisoners must be treated 
in a humane manner while captive. The Qur’ān provides that: “And they feed the 
needy, the orphans and the captives out of their food, despite their love for it (or 
because of their love for God). Indeed we feed you for the sake of pleasing God: we 
do not wish reward or gratitude from you”.179 In the practice of the Prophet the 
prisoners were either held in the mosque or He divided them amongst his 
Companions advising them to “observe good treatment towards the prisoners”.180 As 
one prisoner described:  
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I was with a number of the Ansar when they (Muslim captors) brought me 
from Badr, and when they ate their morning and evening meals they gave me 
the bread and ate the dates themselves in accordance with the orders that the 
apostle had given about us. If anyone had a morsel of bread he gave it to me. 
I felt ashamed and returned it to one of them but he returned it to be 
untouched.”181  
 
Other prisoners also claimed to have had the same treatment.
182
 
Thus, the majority of jurists follow these rules found within the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah providing that prisoners should be clothed if needed as per the practice of the 
Prophet,
183
 that they should be protected from heat, cold, hunger, thirst, and all forms 
of torture
184
 regardless whether military information is needed from them or not.
185
 
Similarly, Article 3(a) of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) 
provides that “in the event of the use of force and in case of armed conflict … 
prisoners of war shall have the right to be fed, sheltered and clothed”. The jurists also 
unanimously believe that the Islamic state cannot execute enemy hostages under their 
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control even if the enemy killed their Muslim brothers held as hostage. This rule was 
followed by Caliph Mu’awiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (d. 60/680) when he refused to 
execute the Roman prisoners he held after the Roman emperor had broken the peace 
treaty with the Muslims by executing the Muslim hostages he held.
186
 
In addition, the majority of jurists believe that the captives should not be 
separated from their families who are also captured, such as parents from their 
children.
187
 This rule complies with Article 82 of the Geneva Convention (IV) for the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
188
 Article 3(a) of the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) also provides that “in the event of the 
use of force and in case of armed conflict … it is a duty to arrange visits or reunions 
of the families separated by the circumstances of war”. 
 
6.6 Night Attack 
There is no provision in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which 
prohibits night attacks. However, in Islamic law attacking at night may be seen as 
forbidden, because the enemy is taken by surprise and is not given the due 
warning.
189
  A Hadith reported by Anas Ibn Malik claims that “whenever the Prophet 
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reached a people by night, he never started an attack until it was morning”.190 Thus, a 
night attack would be regarded as a war crime under Islamic law.
191
 However, the 
majority of jurists believe it is permissible to attack at night
192
 because of a later 
Hadith reported by Al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah about how “the Prophet was asked if it 
was permissible to attack the enemy by night which may result in casualties among 
women and children.  Then, the Prophet replied that they (women and children), are 
from them (the enemy warriors)”.193 As evidence of modern state practice, the 
Report on the Practice of Algeria recalls the principle whereby war is a ruse. The 
report also notes that Algerian fighters during the war of independence 
predominantly used methods of war such as surprise attacks, ambushes, camouflage, 
misinformation and mock operations.
194
  
 
6.7 Prohibition of Mutilation  
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Also steaming from the principle of humanity are the prohibition of mutilation and 
rules on how to deal with the dead bodies of the enemies. At the battle of Uhud 
bodies of Muslims including the Prophet’s uncle were mutilated by the enemy and 
the Prophet and his followers vowed to do the same if they got the chance.  However, 
following this, the Qur’ānic verse on mutilation (16:126-127) was revealed and the 
Prophet in return prohibited betrayal and mutilation.
195
 This instruction was then 
followed by Abu Bakr instructing to “beware of mutilation, because it is a sin and a 
disgusting act”.196 Practice shows evidence that this principle is still followed. For 
example, the Instructions to the Muslim Fighter of 1993 provide that “Islam … 
forbids the mutilation of enemy wounded”.197 Likewise, during the Iran–Iraq War, 
Iran evacuated wounded Iraqi combatants to safe places, in accordance with the 
principles of Islamic law.
198
 Furthermore, Article 11(a) of the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (1990) provides that “human beings are born free, and no one 
has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or exploit them, and there can be no 
subjugation but to Allah the Almighty”. 
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It is also regarded as mutilation if dead bodies are just left to rot without a 
burial.
199
 Reports detail several occasions where the Prophet buried the dead after 
hostilities regardless of whether they were enemies or Muslims.
200
 Burying the dead 
is also a rule provided by the first Geneva Convention Article 17 1949. Furthermore, 
when the bodies are handed back to the enemy nothing should be accepted in return. 
At Ghazwah al- Khandaq or the Battle of the Trench, Nawfal Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Al-
Mughirah died when he attempted to jump the trench with his horse. When the 
Meccans offered payment for receiving the body of Nawfal, the Prophet gave them 
the body but refused the payment.
201
 Likewise, Article 3(a) of the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam provides that “in the event of the use of force 
and in case of armed conflict … it is prohibited to mutilate dead bodies”. 
 
6.8 Child Soldiers 
Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute consider as a war crime any 
acts of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into an 
armed conflict or using them to participate actively in hostilities. Lubanga, the first 
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accused to appear before the ICC, was the first to be charged under the above 
provisions of the ICC Statute.
202
  
Children are protected in different ways in Islam and are free from fighting 
within an armed conflict according to Islamic rules of war.
203
 Islamic laws protecting 
children are similar to those under the international legal system. In particular the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols, more specifically, 
that preventing children from being involved in, or used for, armed conflicts. This is 
evidenced in the fact that it was widely accepted by the Islamic world.
204
   
The paper prepared by UNICEF titled ‘Investing in The Children of The 
Islamic World’ confirms that Islam forbids child soldiers, labour, pornography, 
trafficking and much more leading to abuse towards children; however, unfortunately 
it is not fully practiced in the Islamic states of today’s world.205 The Organization of 
Islamic Conference supporting the objectives of the UNICEF paper has had 
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difficulties implementing the rules preventing abuse of children. However, the 
progress of eliminating child abuse is outlined in the UN reports on child soldiers.
206
 
Islamic laws governing war and the prohibition of using children for such 
cause is contrary to Iran’s claim in 1983 to the UN that children are fighting during 
war time to fulfil their religious duties.
207
 However, within Islam and according to 
the Qur’ān  and Sunnah the protection of children extends to a child until he or she 
has reached the age of puberty and then maturity.
208
 This protection prevents the 
attack of children and forcing them to fight within an armed conflict even if the child 
wishes to do so.
209
  
Furthermore, Hadiths from the Prophet and Qur’ān texts prevent the attack of 
specific categories of enemy non-combatants which includes women and children 
amongst others.
210
 This confirms that children are regarded as non-combatants and 
not able to fight. It is maintained that if children and woman stand guard over the 
enemy’s army or strongholds, or if she warns the enemy or throws stones at the 
Muslim army, she still cannot be targeted.
211
 A well-known Hadith provides: “move 
forward in the name of God, by God, and on the religion of God’s Prophet. Do not 
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kill an elderly, or a child, or a woman, do not misappropriate booty, gather your 
spoils, do good for God loves good doers”.212 Thus, it is unanimously believed that 
women and children should be protected during wartime and should not be 
targeted.
213
   
Jurists outlined that those under the age of fifteen and those who have not 
reached puberty yet are protected and immune,
214
 from being attacked and from 
taking part in war.
215
 This is also the age limit provided for the protection of children 
under the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, 8 June 1997.
216
 The main 
justifications for this are provided by different jurists for instance Al-Ghazali 
provides that they ‘are not fit for fighting’.217 Therefore, fighting can only be 
committed against enemy combatants as provided by the Qur’ān “And fight in the 
way of God those who fight against you”.218 
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Additionally, some jurists provide justifications of immunity, for women and 
children through the principle of maslahah (public interest), because they can be 
enslaved or exchanged for Muslim prisoners of war, or for ransom.
219
 However, 
jurists provide that if women and children are involved in fighting during the war 
they will forfeit their right to immunity but their opinions differ on this.
220
 For 
instance, Sufyan Al-Thawri (d. 161/778) provides that it is still undesirable to attack 
children even if they fight during the war.
221
 However, others believe that if a woman 
is a Queen and a child is a King of the enemy and they fight in battle, they can be 
killed.
222
 
Puberty on its own does not qualify a child to be an adult; he must also have 
gained maturity with his puberty. Thus, without maturity his spiritual guardian or 
parent must remain caring for him and he will still be regarded as a child and not fit 
for fighting during an armed conflict.
223
 Generally, females are not fit for fighting in 
Islam and remain with their guardian until marriage.
224
 The majority of jurists 
believe that a child must also be of age (have reached puberty and gained maturity) 
to grant Aman to anyone including non-Muslims.
225
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Furthermore, the Shafi’i school of law provide that even if a child has become 
of age they still cannot participate in an armed conflict unless they have their 
parent’s permission. This is based on the Hadith where the Prophet sent a young 
soldier back from the battlefields to attain permission from his parents to fight in the 
war. He also prevented a young Muslim called Ibn Umar from fighting in the war (at 
the Battle of Uhud) because he was 14 years old, but after one year allowed him to 
fight in another war.
226
 
In analysis, under the Qur’ān and Sunnah it is obvious that child soldiers are 
prohibited and the qualification of a soldier is that of one who is mature and has 
reached the age of puberty, is sane, strong enough to fight and not female. The 
general age for fighting is seen in the past as 15 years old, if he has gained maturity. 
However, in modern times this ‘age’ maybe different as it can be argued that those at 
the time of the Prophet had to mature quickly, but today children tend to mature a lot 
slower. 
Unfortunately, the practice of Islamic States
227
 using child soldiers in modern 
times is not a reflection of Islamic law as confirmed by Maryam Elahi in her piece on 
child soldiers
228
 and by the UNICEF paper titled ‘Investing in the Children of the 
Islamic World’.229 Therefore, there is a great need to implement the rules of Islamic 
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law within Islamic States to achieve a more humane society, whilst also enjoying 
human rights similar to that of those enjoyed on an international level. 
 
7. Conclusion  
This study evidences that there is room for the contribution of the Islamic civilisation 
within international humanitarian law and a conversation between different 
civilisations is needed in developing and applying international humanitarian law 
norms. The present author endorses Judge Bedjaoui’s contention that ‘[T]he West 
has either remained ignorant of the contribution of the Arabs and Islam to 
international law or has disregarded it. With the exception of a few highly specialised 
historians, Western scholars who have sought to trace back the history of 
international law have done so after their fashion without hardly ever thinking of the 
Islamic contribution. All over the world, even today, the great majority of treatises 
and manuals of international law short-circuit the history of international law by 
mentioning the contribution of Greco-Roman antiquity and then calmly passing over 
the contribution which Islam made from the seventh to the fifteenth century.’230  
One cannot but speculate about the intentions behind such an omission. Is it 
due to a hidden rivalry between the main religion of the West, namely Christianity, 
and Islam; is it a fear of giving any legitimacy to a religious law by a world striving 
to be secular; or is it merely ignorance on the subject? The omission of a genuine 
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mention of the Arab or Islamic influence in the narratives of other parts of Western 
and international history suggests something other than a mere coincidence.  
 
 
